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 he category 2 Hurricane Gustav made landfall on the Louisiana Coast on Sept. 1, 2008, 
nearly three years to the day after Hurricane Katrina, resulting in an evacuation of 
approximately 2 million people and considerable property damage.  Although it did not 
match the intensity or consequence of Hurricane Katrina, the experience of anticipating and 
responding to Hurricane Gustav had the potential to trigger emotional and physical 
consequences among a population previously traumatized or displaced by Hurricane Katrina.  
Gustav also had the potential to exert a considerable impact upon the overall economic, social, 
and emotional recovery of these populations.   
 
The Gulf Coast Child and Family Health Study (G-CAFH), a randomly-sampled post-Katrina 
longitudinal cohort study of 1,079 displaced and impacted households in Louisiana and 
Mississippi, was uniquely positioned to examine the evolving impact of Gustav upon a previously 
traumatized population.  G-CAFH researchers were in the final stages of the third round of 
interviews with the study group when Hurricane Gustav struck, thus allowing for comparable 
pre- and post-event data for approximately 700 respondent households.  Further information on 
the study, including previous reports and peer-reviewed research articles, may be found at 
www.gcafh.org.  
 
In particular, the research team was interested in the following issues:  
 
 Evacuation: People’s response to the event itself – did they evacuate, and if so, where 
and how did they evacuate?  How did people decide whether to evacuate or not?  For 
those who did, what was the economic impact of the evacuation? 
 
 Recovery Impact: What was the impact on post-Katrina recovery amongst this group, 
particularly since Hurricane Gustav may have set some people even further back in their 
efforts to recover their homes and their lives? 
 
 Psychological Impact: What was the emotional impact on adults and children: among 
adults, did Hurricane Gustav trigger Katrina-related post-traumatic stress disorder 
symptoms? Among children, did Hurricane Gustav lead to newly experienced behavioral or 
emotional problems? 
 
 Health Effects: What were the health consequences of Hurricane Gustav on children, 
particularly those who needed access to medications and medical care? 
 
Within three weeks of Hurricane Gustav, the G-CAFH field team had reassembled after their 
own evacuation and begun re-contacting the 718 respondents whom they had recently 
interviewed as part of the third round of the study.  Of these 718 respondents, 528 were 
located and interviewed (a 73.5% retention rate).  Respondents received a $20 gift card for 
participating in this study supplement, which had received approval by the Columbia University 














 Evacuation:  Given the considerable media attention, warnings from weather officials, 
mandatory evacuation orders from elected officials, and past experience with Hurricane 
Katrina, approximately 84% of the people living in mandatory evacuation areas decided to 
evacuate.  Among those who elected not to evacuate, the top reason cited was that, “the 
storm and its aftermath wouldn’t be bad.”  When asked if they would obey future 
mandatory evacuation orders, 18% of those who evacuated said they were only 
“somewhat likely” or “not at all likely” to obey, whereas 52% of the non-evacuees said 
they were somewhat or not at all likely to obey.  If these findings are extrapolated 
proportionately to the larger population, as many as 25% might not obey a future 
evacuation order.  The average cost for those who did evacuate in response to Gustav, 
taking in to account food, shelter, and transportation, was $484.  Over 80% of those 
surveyed said they had difficulty paying for the evacuation.   
 
 Recovery Impact:  Nearly a quarter of those surveyed reported that their recovery from 
Katrina had worsened as a result of Gustav.  Over half the people surveyed said that they 
had lost income as a result of Gustav, and 5% indicated they had lost their job.  Study 
participants in Louisiana were more likely to have reported that they lost income than 
were Mississippi participants. 
 
 Psychological Impact:  Among both adults and children, financial and housing 
circumstances were significantly associated with emotional and behavioral impacts of 
Gustav.  The prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among adults was 
nearly three times higher among people in households earning less than $10,000 annually 
when compared to individuals in households earning over $20,000.  Similarly, among 
children, those living in unstable housing were two and a half times as likely to have 
emotional or behavioral problems as those in stable housing. 
 
 Health Impact:  Approximately one-quarter of children needed medication during or 
after Hurricane Gustav, and most (87%) had no problems getting it.  Twenty-eight 
percent had a condition that required on-going medical care, but very few parents 
reported having any problems accessing care (7%).  Slightly over 10% of children 
experienced an illness or injury that required care during or immediately after Gustav, and 




The Gulf Coast Child and Family Health Study (G-CAFH) is an ongoing research effort conducted 
by Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) in partnership 
with The Children’s Health Fund (CHF) and with researchers at the Louisiana State 
University School of Public Health.  This study supplement was underwritten by a generous 
grant from The Merck Foundation.  The project has chronicled the physical and mental 
health consequences of the initial hurricane and traced the path to recovery experienced by 
1,079 randomly sampled individuals in Louisiana and Mississippi since Hurricane Katrina.  Initial 
findings from the study pointed to serious mental health needs for affected children, and led to 
the development and deployment of mobile mental health units by CHF alongside their primary 
medical care mobile units in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Gulfport/Biloxi.





urricane Gustav approached the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana and Mississippi in the 
final week of August 2008 alternating between an “extreme” category 4 storm and a 
“catastrophic” category 5 storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale. As it looped northwestward 
through the Gulf of Mexico, with windspeeds over 155 miles per hour, projections by the US 
National Weather Service’s National Hurricane Center indicated potential landfall along a wide 
swath of the Gulf Coast, from High Island, Texas east to the Alabama-Florida border.  In 
anticipation of the hurricane’s landfall, officials in nineteen parishes in Louisiana and the three 
coastal Mississippi counties ordered a mandatory evacuation of all residents, encompassing a 
potential total population of 2,350,0001.  An estimated 13,000 households in the projected path 
were still living in FEMA travel trailers, either on private property or in group settings such as 
trailer parks2.   
 
The National Hurricane Center’s warnings in the days leading up to landfall predicted winds that 
could reach sustained speeds of up to 115 miles per hour, “extremely dangerous” storm surges, 
and isolated tornadoes.  Louisiana governor Bobby Jindall, anxious not to repeat any of the 
hurricane missteps of his predecessor Kathleen 
Blanco, initiated an aggressive communication 
campaign to urge all those in the storm’s projected 
path to evacuate.  Among elected officials, New 
Orleans mayor Ray Nagin was perhaps the most 
emphatic.  Two days prior to landfall, Mayor Nagin 
said at a news conference that Hurricane Gustav 
was the “mother of all storms.”  He went on to say 
to the city’s residents and visitors, “You need to be 
scared, you need to be concerned, and you need to 
get your butts moving out of New Orleans.  This is 
the storm of the century.” 
 
According to administrative records and newspaper 
accounts, as illustrated in Table 1, the resulting 
evacuation was among the largest in recent US 
history, second only to that of 2005’s Hurricane 
Rita in Texas. Most of the people in Hurricane 
Gustav’s projected path had experienced Hurricane 
Katrina as well.  When the hurricane did make 
landfall at Cocodrie, Louisiana on September 1, 
2008, it had weakened to a Category 2 hurricane, with windspeeds of approximately 100 miles 
per hour.  The hurricane followed a northwesterly path, and over a three-day period resulted in 
48 storm-related deaths and approximately $4.1 billion in losses in Louisiana alone.   
 
                                                 
1 Louisiana parishes under mandatory evacuation orders included the following: Allen, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia, 
Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, 
Terrebone, Vermillion, and Washington; Mississippi counties included Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson.  Population estimates of 
2,354,405 were mainly drawn from the US Census American Community Survey (2005-2007), reflecting post-Katrina population 
estimates, and for St Bernard and Cameron parishes from the 2006 US Census Total Population Estimates. 
2 According to data published by the FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery Office, there were 13,324 active households living in group, 
commercial, or private trailers as of Aug. 28, 2008 
H 
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Among those in the path were 718 members of Columbia University’s Gulf Coast Child & Family 
Health Study who had completed in-person interviews with the study’s field staff over the 
course of the 2008 summer.  These 718 members represented a portion of the 1,079 
respondents comprising the full study cohort of Katrina-displaced and affected individuals 
established in 2006 (see Table A2).  The study team decided to re-deploy rapidly in order to 
assess the impact of Hurricane Gustav on this population, which previously had been so 
extensively affected by Hurricane Katrina.  Within three weeks the field team began re-
contacting respondents, and over the course of 18 days was able to locate and re-interview 528 
respondents.  The data in this report are drawn from their interviews. 
 
Table 1.  Largest Evacuations in United States Since 19903 
Year Event Total # Evacuated 
2005 Hurricane Rita4 2,500,000 
2008 Hurricane Gustav5 2,000,000 
1999 Hurricane Floyd 1,761,192 
1998 Hurricane Georges 1,563,000 
2008 Hurricane Ike6 1,200,000 
2005 Hurricane Katrina7 1,000,000 
1992 Hurricane Andrew 650,000 
1996 Hurricane Fran 500,000 
1998 Hurricane Bonnie 350,000 
2002 Hurricane Lili 330,000 
2001 World Trade Center Destruction 300,000 
1994 Hurricane Gordon 300,000 
1993 Hurricane Emily 250,000 
1996 Hurricane Bertha 250,000 
 
Evacuation Decisions, Logistics, and Economic Impacts 
 
Given the urgent warnings and mandatory evacuation orders, and their recent experience with 
Hurricane Katrina, 84% of the study group living in mandatory evacuation areas evacuated 
prior to Hurricane Gustav’s landfall (see Table A4 in the Appendix).  Among those who did not 
evacuate, a little under half had not evacuated prior to Hurricane Katrina, either.  Among the 
households who did evacuate prior to Hurricane Gustav, approximately two-thirds had 
evacuated prior to Hurricane Katrina and one-third had not (see Table A4).  There were few 
statistically significant demographic differences between those who evacuated and those who 
did not (Table A3), although in Louisiana the likelihood of evacuating increased with household 
income, and in both states those individuals still living in group trailer sites were less likely to 
evacuate than those living in homes or on private property.   
 
As illustrated in Table 2, it is evident that among those who did evacuate, their experience with 
Hurricane Katrina and the mandatory evacuation calls were significant motivators.  Among 
those who did not evacuate, over one-third did not regard the impending storm as being 
                                                 
3 For all events with dates on or before 2003, Dotson, Lori and J. Jones, “Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency 
Evacuations, Vol 2,” Sandia National Laboratories, Contract # NUREG/CR-6864, SAND2004-5901 
4 New York Times, September 24, 2005, “Storm And Crisis: The Evacuation; 'Katrina Effect' Pushed Texans Into Gridlock.” 
5 New York Times, August 31, 2008, “2 Million Flee Storm; G.O.P. Cuts Back.” 
6 Office of Governor Rick Perry, Press Release September 23, 2008, http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/11301/ 
7 Wolshon, Brian and Ben McArdle, “Temporospatial Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Regional Evacuation Traffic Patterns,” Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 1, 2009.  Authors attribute this estimate to FEMA and former LA Governor Blanco. 
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sufficiently dangerous to warrant an evacuation.  This finding raises challenging questions about 
the efficacy of risk communication among specific sub-groups, since a variety of apparently 
trusted sources (news media, local elected officials, hurricane experts) all offered similar 
messages with varying degrees of urgency regarding the storm’s potential strength. Also telling 
are the other top reasons offered for not evacuating – that people did not have the financial 
means, or that they felt compelled to protect their homes and possessions.  As described later 
in this report, the financial burden of evacuation can be extremely onerous to those without 
financial means or resources, and this evacuation barrier is understandable.  Prior experiences 
with Hurricane Katrina may have sensitized people to the potential for lawlessness and civic 
disorder in a hurricane’s aftermath, leading people to decide to stay behind to protect their 
homes. 
 
Table 2.  Rationale for Evacuation Decisions 
Top 5 reasons why people DID evacuate, 
n=410 
Top 5 reasons why people DID NOT evacuate, 
n=118 
Because of Katrina experience (50.7%) Thought the storm wouldn’t be bad (38.1%)
Calls for evacuation by local officials (44.2%) Didn’t have financial means to leave (24.6%) 
Statements by weather officials (29.5%) Wanted to protect house (16.1%) 
Because of emergency authorities (15.4%) Just didn’t want to leave (13.6%) 
Friends & family convinced them (12.4%) Didn’t have transportation (10.2%) 
Note:  Multiple responses were possible, so percentages will not add to 100% 
 
When asked about their likelihood of evacuating in the event of a future hurricane (see Table 
3), given a similar mandatory evacuation order, over half of those who did not evacuate for 
Hurricane Gustav are only “somewhat” likely to obey or would not obey at all.  Nearly one-fifth 
of those who did evacuate for Gustav might not evacuate when ordered to do so in the future.  
If these proportions were generalized to the larger population, as much as one-quarter of the 
population might not evacuate despite mandatory orders to do so and personal experience of 
the devastating consequences of catastrophic hurricanes8. 
 
People with children evacuated at the same rate as those without (see Table A10).  Similarly, 
their reasons for not evacuating were similar to those expressed by households without children 
– the storm wouldn’t be that bad, no financial means, and no transportation (see Table A5). 
 
Figure 1 and Table A4 illustrate that most of the respondents who did evacuate remained 
nearby in the region, having 
evacuated an average of 167 
miles from their homes.  
Approximately two-thirds of 
Mississippians evacuated 
within their own state with a 
little over an additional 15% 
evacuating to Alabama.  
Among Louisianians, 
approximately one-third 
remained within the state, an additional 15% evacuated to Mississippi, and then another third 
went to Alabama, Georgia, or Texas.  Surprisingly, very few people in the study cohort used 
                                                 
8  Estimated as (.181 somewhat/not likely x .777 who evacuated) + (.522 somewhat/not likely x .223 who did evacuate) = .257  
Table 3.  Likelihood of Obeying Future Mandatory Evacuation 
Orders 
 Among those who… 
 Evacuated Did NOT Evacuate 
N 408 117 
Very likely to obey (%) 81.9 47.9 
Somewhat likely to obey (%) 11.0 36.8 
NOT likely to obey (%) 7.1 15.4 
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public transportation to effect their evacuation (only 16 households among the 528).  The 
average size of evacuation parties was approximately five, with an average of two adults, one 
child, and two others not formally part of the respondent’s household.  There were differences 
in the evacuation parties between those households living in “stable” versus “unstable” housing 
(unstable being defined as living in a travel trailer, or living in a place where one was uncertain 
if one could stay for a year or more).  Within each state, the households living in unstable 
housing tended to have larger evacuation parties (5.6 people in Louisiana, versus 5.1 among 
stably housed Louisiana households; 5.1 in Mississippi, versus 3.9 among stably housed 
Mississippi households), and were also slightly more likely to have non-household members as 




Evacuation costs were a significant issue 
for many of the members of the study 
group.  As detailed in Table A6, the 
overall cost for evacuating – considering 
food, shelter, and transportation costs9, 
but not adjusting for differences in the 
number of days evacuated or the number 
of people in an evacuation party – ranged 
from a mean of $371 for Mississippi 
households living in stable housing to 
$572 for Louisiana households living in 
unstable housing.  This difference in cost 
was clearly related to the duration of the 
evacuation, which varied from an average 
of 3.4 days among stably housed 
Mississippians to 5.9 days for unstably 
housed Louisianians.  These represented 
out-of-pocket expenses, and were not 
generally reimbursable.  Food was 
generally the largest single expense 
among the three.   
 
Examining the average evacuation cost 
per person per day, as illustrated in Table 
4, does illustrate one interesting finding – that there is slightly less variation between the states 
and the housing circumstances, and that it may be possible to use such a figure in evacuation 
planning and household preparedness campaigns.  Notwithstanding that these amounts are 
specific to the Gulf Coast during a summertime of high gasoline prices, and that they are 
restricted to three major cost items (transportation, food, and shelter), emergency planners 
might consider a rule-of-thumb of $25 per person per day for an estimated five-day evacuation 
to cover most costs associated with an evacuation.  That would suggest that a family of four 
would need to have a minimum of $500 available, preferably in cash. 
                                                 
9 Transportation costs included gasoline, tolls, fares, and evacuation-associated repairs.  According to the Energy Information 
Administration, average retail price for regular gas was $3.62 in the week of Sep 1, 2008 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html 
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Given these costs, it is not surprising how many people reported that they had a great deal of 
difficulty paying for the evacuation, ranging from 70.0% of stably housed Mississippians to a 
high of 88.6% of unstably housed Louisianians (Table A6).  Although most people did not 
report many days in which they had problems securing food, water, or shelter, a large number 
reported having lost income as a result of Hurricane Gustav.  As illustrated in Table A7, over 
60% of Louisiana respondents said that they had lost income in their households, and as many 
as 7.7% of unstably housed Louisianians reported having lost their jobs as well, regardless as 
to whether they evacuated.  Although fewer people in Mississippi reported having lost income, it 
was still a sizeable proportion – 
45.6% of the unstably housed and 
51.9% of the stably housed.  A large 
majority of the study participants 
reported that their homes sustained 
very little or no damage (87.7%), 
while 8.5% reported that their home 
was seriously damaged, 1.7% said 
their home was destroyed, and 2.0% 
had not yet seen their homes at the 
time of the interview. 
 
Emotional Impact and Recovery 
 
When asked to describe what effect Hurricane Gustav had on their ongoing recovery from 
Hurricane Katrina, the study participants described a complex set of issues that often included 
financial, psychological, and logistical problems.  Financially, the costs of evacuating, repairing 
or replacing Gustav-damaged property, or making up for lost income, contributed to an 
unending cycle of impoverishment and indebtedness.  Funds that had been set aside for Katrina 
repairs were used for Gustav-related 
costs.  Many participants described the 
emotional effects of imagining that 
they might be re-living their Katrina 
experience of loss and displacement.  
And practically, a number of people 
described post-Katrina cottages and 
trailers that were damaged, or in rare 
cases destroyed.  In order to quantify 
the magnitude of Katrina-related post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the 
study participants were given a ten-
item PTSD screener10.  Participants 
were asked how often in the past 
three weeks they had experienced 
upsetting memories, dreams, feelings 
                                                 
10  The ten-item screener includes five arousal and five re-experiencing factors, modified by Brewin et al (“Brief screening 
instrument for post-traumatic stress disorder,” CR Brewin, S Rose et al, Brit Jnl of Psychiatry (2002) 181:158-162) from Foa’s PTSD 
Symptom Scale-Self Report (“Reliability and validity of a brief instrument for assessing post-traumatic stress disorder,” EB Foa, DS 
Riggs, CV Dancu, Jnl of Traumatic Stress (1993) 6:459-473). 
Table 4.  Average evacuation cost per person per 
day 
 Cost n 
Overall $ 20.42 410 
Louisiana, unstably housed $ 17.55 146 
Louisiana, stably housed $ 21.78 69 
Mississippi, unstably housed $ 19.57 135 
Mississippi, stably housed $ 27.75 60 
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or reminders of Hurricane Katrina, how often they had experienced reactions such as a 
quickened heartbeat or stomach churning when reminded of Katrina, and whether they had 
difficulty sleeping or concentrating, how often they were irritable or jumpy, and whether they 
had a heightened awareness of danger to themselves or others.  Individuals who reported 
having experienced at least six of these ten symptoms an average of two or more times per 
week were characterized as displaying symptoms consistent with a PTSD diagnosis.  As 
illustrated in Table A7 and Figure 3, nearly one-fifth of respondents living in unstable housing 
circumstances had symptoms consistent with Katrina-associated PTSD; in Louisiana, those in 
unstable housing were more than twice as likely to report these PTSD symptoms as were 
people living in stable housing conditions.  It is clear from Figure 3 that some groups fared 
worse than others – in particular, people whose household income was less than $10,000 
annually were far more likely to report PTSD symptoms (28.5%) than were people earning 
more than $20,000 annually (10.5%). 
 
Respondents were also asked to characterize their situation in Gustav’s aftermath as compared 
to their circumstances prior to the hurricane.  Approximately one-quarter said that their 
situation was worse than it had been before the hurricane, 70% said their situation was similar 
to what it had been previously, and about 5% said their situation was better.  Generally 
speaking, respondents living in unstable housing were more likely to report that their situation 
had worsened since Gustav (26.4% in Louisiana and 24.7% in Mississippi) than were those 




Many children are adaptive and highly resilient in the face of the types of stressors presented 
by hurricane evacuations.  A number of the parents in the study described their children’s 
reactions to the Gustav evacuation and experience of the storm in positive terms: children who 
were excited by the adventure of the evacuation, curious about the spectacle of a major storm, 
or who viewed the entire episode as an unplanned vacation from school.  Moreover, a number 
of parents noted that their children were happy to return home, and were relieved when they 
found little or no damage to their homes or possessions.  On the other hand, about one-fifth of 
the parents and caregivers highlighted specific problems expressed by their children – among 
these children a number of them were anxious or scared of the storm, depressed, or distressed 
about their upset routines.  Several parents noted that their children tried to pack and take all 
their possessions, and a few noted an increased incidence of respiratory problems.  As 
illustrated in Table A8, 24.7% of households reported having at least one child who experienced 
new emotional or behavioral problems that emerged after Hurricane Gustav.  When parents 
were asked about specific children, the most common problem noted was being nervous or 
afraid (30.8%, overall).   
 
Among all families, there were no differences between the two states in the proportion of 
children experiencing emotional or behavioral problems.  There were, however, statistically 
significant differences in the proportions of children experiencing at least one emotional or 
behavioral symptom by housing status within each state.  Children in unstable housing were far 
more likely to have had a parent report one of these emotional or behavioral symptoms than 
were children living in stable housing.  A multivariate regression analysis was conducted to 
determine which factors were most likely to be associated with children’s emotional or 
behavioral problems (see Table A9).  This analysis examined the impact of socio-demographic 
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characteristics, such race, income or state; household characteristics such as parental mental 
health, unstable housing, and size of household; community characteristics related to perceived 
safety and the parent’s sense of social engagement with the local community; and Katrina-
specific characteristics associated with the number of times the family has moved since the 
hurricane and whether or not they evacuated for Hurricane Gustav.  Each of these factors was 
weighed equally, holding all other factors constant.  According to this analysis, parents were 
over 3 times as likely to report that their children had any emotional or behavioral symptoms if 
they themselves had poor mental health and over twice as likely to report these emotional or 
behavioral issues if they had weak social support networks.  Although these findings of 
children’s mental health are so dependent upon parental reports, which themselves are 
influenced by emotional and psychological factors, they do suggest the primacy of household 
stability – regardless where that household is.  Conversely, it suggests that strengthening the 
parent’s mental health, sense of community, and (re)establishment of informal social supports 
would likely have a large impact on the children. 
 
In terms of physical health problems, approximately one-quarter of the children needed 
medication at some point during or after the hurricane, and overall 13.1% of parents or 
caregivers reported having difficulties obtaining medications when they were needed.  The 
major problems noted were not knowing where to go to get or fill a prescription, and not 
having enough money for the medication (Table A8). 
 
A slightly larger proportion of 
children, ranging from 25.9% in 
Mississippi to 30.0% in 
Louisiana, had pre-existing 
health conditions that needed 
on-going care.  Among those 
children, 11.7% in Louisiana 
experienced difficulty obtaining 
care (mainly because parents or 
caregivers did not know where 
to go to obtain it), although no Mississippi parents reported problems receiving care.  Overall, 
12.8% of the children in both states experienced an illness or injury requiring medical care 
during or immediately after the hurricane, and again only Louisiana children reported difficulties 
obtaining care (it should be noted that these children experiencing problems obtaining care only 
represent 4 out of 257 children, and should not be regarded as sufficiently large enough to be 




This study of how a group of Hurricane Katrina survivors was affected by Hurricane Gustav 
illuminates the ongoing vulnerability – and lack of recovery – among a subset of Gulf Coast 
residents.  Although Gustav inflicted significant damage to parts of the Gulf Coast it was not as 
disastrous as if it had landed as a Category 4 or 5 hurricane, or if the levees had not held.  Still, 
the threat of Gustav had a psychological impact on a previously traumatized population, and the 
evacuation and property damage had an economic impact as well.  Those who were particularly 
vulnerable -- because of their housing or economic instability, or their social circumstances – 
Table 5.  Children experiencing at least one 
emotional/behavioral symptom 
 Percent n 
Overall 41.6 219 
Louisiana, unstably housed 53.3 77 
Louisiana, stably housed 31.4 35 
Mississippi, unstably housed 40.7 81 
Mississippi, stably housed 23.1 26 
Note: Symptoms included being sad or depressed, feeling nervous or afraid, having 
problems sleeping, or having problems getting along with other children
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fared worse both psychologically and economically.  Those who were only partway down the 
path toward post-Katrina recovery seemed to have slipped even further behind. 
 
The research literature suggests that individual and household recovery from disasters is a long-
term process that may be measured by how far a survivor has traveled along three trajectories: 
(a) permanent relief from the disaster itself, both the event-generated stressors (such as 
injuries sustained during an event) and response-generated stressors (such as evacuation and 
displacement); (b) restoration or development of material, emotional, and social resources 
(such as economic stability, housing equity, or social support); and (c) renewal of a capacity for 
economic and social growth.  The last suggests that an individual or household has the 
potential for future-planning; specifically, that there is sufficient certainty and stability in their 
lives that they are not buffeted by daily survival pressures, but can instead engage in activities 
that contribute to individual and social growth.  The recovery process does not demand that a 
survivor achieve each of these goals, but that he or she progresses substantially along those 
paths.  The absence of such progress may be regarded as an ongoing vulnerability.  In addition 
to being vulnerable to daily social and economic pressures, these survivors are particularly 
vulnerable to unexpected future shocks such as subsequent emergencies or disasters.  There 
can be little planning, preparation, or mitigation when one is struggling with day-to-day survival 
demands. 
 
A significant proportion of the people surveyed for this report expressed that vulnerability – or 
ongoing lack of recovery from Katrina – in a variety of ways: through their evacuation decisions 
and the impacts upon them, through the differential psychological effects manifest in both 
adults and children, and through their self-appraised sense of recovery.   
 
Evacuation decision-making was influenced by people’s trust in authorities, but much of that 
trust had eroded during and after Hurricane Katrina, assuming it had existed at all.  Social 
science literature speaks of “dynamic pressures” 11and “acculturative stress” to explain why 
marginalized groups – particularly the poor and segregated ethnic minorities – have little access 
to critical social information sources, little trust in government, and little faith in science, all of 
which influence the decisions people make.  It has been well-established that many of the 
Katrina survivors still struggling to recover from that storm, even three years later, have been 
among the poorest or most disenfranchised.   
 
A number of people who decided not to evacuate did so because of financial constraints, and 
those who did evacuate suffered economic consequences related to the transaction costs of the 
evacuation (chiefly food, shelter, and transportation) and the opportunity costs (lost wages and 
jobs).   The “out-of-pocket” costs of $484 for an average five-day evacuation, and the fact that 
over half the people surveyed lost income as a result of the storm, clearly contributed to the 
economic pressures felt by so many.  Nearly 60% of the people surveyed reported an annual 
household income under $20,000 (which would translate to a maximum of $385 per week in 
gross revenue; among those earning less than $20,000 annually, nearly half earn less than 
$10,000, or approximately $190 per week).  Given such financial fragility, it is hardly surprising 
that Gustav exacted such an immediate economic cost, and had such a dampening effect on 
ongoing Katrina recovery for individual households. 
 
                                                 
11 Wisner, B. (2004). Assessment of Capability and Vulnerability. Mapping vulnerability : disasters, development, and people. G. 
Bankoff, G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst. London ; Sterling, VA, Earthscan Publications: xix, 236 p. 
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Economic and housing circumstances were clearly associated with mental health effects of 
Gustav as well.  Among adults, it was striking that individuals in households earning less than 
$10,000 a year were nearly three times as likely to express PTSD symptoms as were those 
adults from households earning over $20,000 a year.  And children who lived in unstable 
housing were two and a half times as likely to exhibit Gustav-related emotional and behavioral 
issues, according to their parents and caregivers. 
 
Altogether, these findings of the impact of Gustav on Katrina-survivors suggest that 
vulnerability may follow some people wherever they go.  Some of these study participants lived 
in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward or poor communities on the Mississippi Gulf Coast prior to 
Katrina, and have since been displaced or resettled across the region.  Their failure to recover 
has prolonged their vulnerability, and has made them easy targets for a “second wind” such as 
Hurricane Gustav. 







Sampling and Subject Enrollment 
A stratified cluster sampling strategy was used to enroll subjects in to the study in two phases: 
the first in Louisiana in February 2006, the second in Mississippi in August 2006.  Using lists of 
congregate housing sites obtained from FEMA we stratified the lists by type of site (FEMA group 
sites, commercial trailer sites, and hotels) and by size (1-25, 26-50, 51-100, 101+ residential 
units).  Congregate sites were selected within each substratum using a probability proportional 
to size strategy without replacement.  Overall, twenty-six sites were selected as primary 
sampling units: twelve FEMA group sites, ten commercial trailer sites, and four hotel sites.  In 
addition to sampling the displaced population living in congregate settings, we supplemented 
the sample frame in Mississippi with an areal sample.  Using FEMA damage assessment maps 
and databases of the state’s three coastal counties hardest hit by the hurricane, the team 
randomly selected 150 of 650 census blocks (primary sampling unit clusters) which had been 
characterized by FEMA as having sustained moderate, extensive or catastrophic damage.  This 
sampling strategy yields a cohort representative of the approximately 50,000 individuals who 
had been displaced to congregate settings in Louisiana and Mississippi (i.e., trailer parks and 
hotels) as well as approximately 26,000 people who were living in the most extensively-
damaged areas of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, post-Katrina. 
 
As illustrated in Table A1, a total of 4,284 households were sampled as secondary sampling 
units.  Nine hundred and eight-five households were deemed ineligible because they were 
clearly destroyed, vacant, abandoned, or under construction, leaving 3,299 eligible households.  
Among those, 1,587 households had an eligible adult present to whom the study was 
presented; at the remaining 1,712 households, no contact was made despite repeated efforts.  
Among the 1,587 contacted households, 1,082 agreed to be enrolled in the longitudinal study, 
corresponding to a response rate of 32.8% (1,082 / 3,299) and a cooperation rate of 68.1% 
(1,082 / 1,587).  A bias analysis was conducted to identify significant differences between 
respondents who agreed to be followed longitudinally and those who did not.  Individuals who 
did not report their household income and respondents in Louisiana were statistically less likely 
to agree to be followed up, and individuals with poor mental health scores were more likely to 
agree to be followed.  No other socio-demographic or displacement factors were statistically 
significant.  
 
An eligible adult respondent was sought at each sampled household who (a) lived at that site, 
and (b) was the “primary caregiver,” someone who could knowledgably report upon the health 
issues of all the individuals in the household.  Upon enrollment and completion of the baseline 
interview, respondents received small gifts for adults and children, valued at approximately $15 
per household.  At the first follow-up interview, respondents received a $30 gift card and at the 
second follow-up interview they received a $35 gift card.  A verbal informed consent was 
acquired from respondents at the first two interview rounds and a written informed consent was 
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Data collection 
At baseline, selected data were collected on all household members (e.g., age, gender, 
relationship to respondent, school attendance, chronic health conditions).  In addition, a Kish 
sampling strategy was used to randomly select one child in the household for more detailed 
questions.  Domains of interest included pediatric and adult health status; the prevalence of 
chronic medical conditions among sampled households; access to health care and services, 
including health insurance coverage; primary medical, specialty, and dental care needs among 
sampled children; the prevalence of behavioral conditions and learning disabilities among 
children; household characteristics such as social and economic resources; social service needs; 
a brief history of the residents’ displacement after the hurricanes; and the demographics of the 
displaced population.   
 
The first follow-up survey, G-CAFH Wave 2, was conducted as a telephone interview between 
20 – 23 months after Hurricane Katrina.  The survey instrument repeated baseline measures 
and added measures of social support networks, self-efficacy and locus of control, community 
engagement (pre- and post-Katrina), and attitudes towards police and criminal justice systems. 
Among the 1,082 respondents eligible for follow-up, 8 had died and 803 were found and 
interviewed, for a 75.1% follow-up rate.  A bias analysis revealed that the factors most 
associated with attrition were the absence of a working telephone and having lived at a trailer 
park that closed down in between the baseline and follow-up interviews.  Socio-demographic 
characteristics such as race/ethnicity, income, age, housing situation, or state of residence were 
not independently associated with follow-up attrition. 
 
A second follow-up survey, G-CAFH Wave 3, was conducted as an in-person survey between 
June – August 2008, and was suspended when Hurricane Gustav was imminent.  As with earlier 
survey instruments, the Wave 3 survey included repeated measures that captured health access 
and service utilization, mental health, child health and social networks, and included validated 
measures of a “sense of community,” self-efficacy, and post-traumatic growth.  Twenty-four 
community-based interviewers in Louisiana and Mississippi were recruited and trained, and a 
field office was established at the Louisiana State University School of Public Health to 
coordinate the field work.  When the field effort was suspended in the last week of August, 718 
among the 1,055 eligible respondents in the cohort had completed the survey.  Six weeks after 
the hurricane had passed, the field team resumed data collection for a brief three-week period, 
interviewing an additional 59 respondents.  The completed round of data collection thus 
encompassed 777 individuals.  As illustrated in Table A1, we retained 74.5% of respondents in 
this round.  Only 14 people refused to participate, for a 1.9% refusal rate. 
  
The G-CAFH Gustav Supplement was conducted as a telephone interview between Sep. 25 – 
Oct. 13, 2009.  Eligible respondents for this supplemental survey included the 718 participants 
who had completed G-CAFH Wave 3 prior to Hurricane Gustav’s landfall.  Among those eligible 
for the supplement, 528 completed the interview, a 73.5% retention rate. 
 
Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument for the G-CAFH Gustav Supplement was divided in to six sections: (1) 
Evacuation, Event Response, and Return; (2) Recovery Impact; (3) Adult Emotional Impact; (4) 
Child Emotional Impact; (5) Child Medical Impact; and (6) Adult Medical Impact.  Validated 
scales and measures were used wherever feasible, including the Medical Outcome Study’s Short 
Form-12 (SF 12 v2), among whose scales is the mental health component summary score 
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(MCS), a well-regarded measure of mental health distress and disability, as well as the Trauma 
Screening Questionnaire, a ten-item scale highly correlated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
symptoms.  The survey was conducted by trained interviewers as a telephone interview, and 
required 15 – 25 minutes to administer.  Respondents completing the survey received a $20 
WalMart gift card.  The survey and consent process was reviewed and approved by the 
Columbia University Medical Center Institutional Review Board (IRB protocol AAAB-8668). 
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Table A1.  Sampling Response and Recruitment (GCAFH, 2006-2008)
Total Louisiana Mississippi
Wave 1 Baseline (6-12 Months Post-Katrina)
Sampled households 4284 1600 2684
Ineligible at baseline 985 0 985
Eligible at baseline 3299 1600 1699
Households no response/no contact 1712 781 931
Contacted 1587 819 768
 Agreed to follow up, and interviewed 1079 555 524
 Agreed to baseline only, and interviewed 170 114 56
Not Available 169 41 128
Refused 171 111 60
Response ratea (%) 32.6 34.6 30.8
Longitudinal Cooperation rateb (%) 67.9 67.5 68.2
Baseline Cooperation ratec (%) 78.6 81.4 75.5
Refusal rated (%) 10.8 13.6 7.8
Wave 2 (20-23 Months Post-Katrina)
Eligible 1079 555 524
 Agreed to follow up, and interviewed 803 393 410
Refused 14 6 8
Deceased 9 6 3
Incarcerated 2 0 2
 Not available/not found 251 150 101
Retention ratee (%) 75.2 71.6 79.0
Refusal rated (%) 1.3 1.1 1.5
Wave 3 (33-38 Months Post-Katrina)
Total eligible from baseline 1079 555 524
Ineligible from prior wave 24 13 11
Eligible 1055 542 513
 Agreed to follow up, and interviewed 777 403 374
Refused 14 5 9
Deceased 13 9 4
Incarcerated 8 1 7
 Not available/not found 243 124 119
Retention ratee (%) 75.1 75.8 74.5
Refusal rated (%) 1.4 0.9 1.8
Gustav Supplement (33-38 Months Post-Katrina)
Eligible 718 355 363
 Agreed to follow up, and interviewed 529 267 262
Refused 18 11 7
Deceased 2 0 2
Incarcerated 0 0 0
 Not available/not found 169 77 92
Retention ratee (%) 73.9 75.2 72.6
Refusal rated (%) 2.5 3.1 1.9
Notes: aResponse rate  = (agreed to follow-up/total eligible). bLongitudinal Cooperation rate  = (total agreed and followed-
up/contacted). cBaseline Cooperation rate =  (total interviewed/contacted). dRefusal rate  = (refused/contacted). 
eRetention rate  = (interviewed/(eligible-deceased-incarcerated)).
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n % n % n %
State
Louisiana 555 51.4 355 49.4 260 49.2
Mississippi 524 48.6 363 50.6 269 50.8
Total 1079 718 529
Gender
Male 439 40.7 276 38.4 201 38.0
Female 640 59.3 442 61.6 328 62.0
Total 1079 718 529
Yes 426 39.5 295 41.1 220 41.6
No 653 60.5 423 58.9 309 58.4
Total 1079 718 529
Race
Black 516 49.4 340 48.8 249 48.5
White 458 43.8 317 45.5 239 46.6
Latino 35 3.4 18 2.6 12 2.3
Other 36 3.4 22 3.1 13 2.5
Total 1045 697 513
<$10,000 316 30.1 190 27.2 128 24.9
$10,000-20,000 345 33.0 228 32.7 170 33.1
$20,000-35,000 183 17.5 133 19.0 105 20.4
$35,000-50,000 95 9.0 65 9.3 46 9.0
$50,000+ 78 7.4 57 8.2 45 8.7
Refused/Don't know 31 3.0 25 3.6 20 3.9
Total 1048 698 514
Stable 379 52.8 267 50.5
Unstable 339 47.2 262 49.5
Total 718 529
(Jun-Aug 2008) (Oct 2008)
Housing Stabilitya
Table A2.  Cohort Summary (G-CAFH, 2008) [Row Percentages]
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported permanent and stable home, 
excluding any trailers, and does not plan on moving in the next year.
Household Income
Households with Children under 18
Baseline Sampling Frame CAFH Plus
(2006)






Households with kids < 19 yrs 81.3 80.0 79.9
All other households 78.5 72.3 76.1
Income (%)
<$10,000 72.0 72.9 70.4
$10,000-20,000 79.2 79.0 79.1
$20,000-35,000 85.9 75.6 81.7
$35,000-50,000 83.3 61.3 72.1
$50,000+ 90.0 83.9 86.3
Unstable a 78.7 75.0 76.8
Stable 82.1 74.6 78.6
1-5 76.4 77.4 76.8
6-10 83.7 71.4 77.0
10+ 85.2 76.6 80.5
Group trailer site 85.7 81.8 82.8
Private trailer 83.3 84.2 83.9
House 81.3 73.6 78.0
Other 62.5 66.7 66.0
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported 
permanent and stable home, excluding any trailers, and does not plan on moving in the next year.
Katrina Housing History (%)
Housing Status (%)
Table A3.  Hurricane Gustav Evacuation Demographics (G-CAFH, 2008)
Total Evacuated (n)
Household Status (%)






Evacuated b Did Not Evacuate Total
Evacuated b n (%)a 264 (58.0) 40 (8.8) 304 (66.8)
Did Not Evacuate n (%) 118 (26.0) 33 (7.2) 151 (33.2)
Total 382 (84.0) 73 (16.0) 455 (100.0)
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups. 
Table A4.  Hurricanes Katrina & Gustav Evacuation Statistics Among People Living in 
Mandatory Evacuation Areas (G-CAFH, 2008)
Gustav
Notes: aEach percentage listed is the number of respondents in a given cell divided by the total n. bEvacuation  is 
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Unstable a Stable Unstable Stable
Total (n) 100 115 105 91 411
Personal Experience from Katrina 45.0 47.8 50.5 61.5 50.1
Calls for evacuation by local officials (eg mayor) 47.0 52.2 40.0 40.7 45.3
Statements by weather officials 24.0 28.7 32.4 35.2 29.9
Emergency authorities (FEMA, DHS) 19.0 11.3 15.2 19.8 16.1
Friends/family convinced them 14.0 11.3 11.4 18.7 13.6
Personal Experience from other hurricane 5.0 2.6 10.5 9.9 6.8
Fear of levees breaking, flooding, or wind 5.0 5.2 2.9 6.6 4.9
Other 7.0 63.1 8.6 4.4 6.6
Total (n) 27 25 35 31 118
Thought the storm wouldn't be that bad 29.6 48.0 40.0 54.8 43.2
Didn't have the financial means 18.5 32.0 25.7 32.3 27.1
Protect home and possessions 14.8 8.0 22.9 16.1 16.1
Just didn't want to leave 7.4 8.0 17.1 25.9 15.3
Did not have transportation 11.1 8.0 14.3 6.5 10.2
Had to take care of someone who was unable to leave 11.1 8.0 2.9 6.5 6.8
Needed to take care of pets 3.7 0.0 5.7 9.7 5.1
Other* 40.7 28.0 14.3 12.9 22.9
Total (n) 10 11 10 13 44
Thought the storm wouldn't be that bad 40.0 36.4 40.0 38.5 38.6
Didn't have the financial means 20.0 36.4 40.0 46.2 36.4
Protect home and possessions 20.0 9.1 20.0 23.1 18.2
Did not have transportation 20.0 9.1 30.0 7.7 15.9
Just didn't want to leave 0.0 0.0 10.0 15.4 6.8
Other 40.0 27.3 33.3 15.4 27.3
Total (n) 126 140 139 121 526
Very likely 69.8 72.2 76.2 79.3 74.3
Somewhat likely 17.5 15.0 18.0 16.5 16.7
Not very likely 4.8 6.4 2.9 1.7 4.0
Not likely at all 7.9 6.4 2.9 2.5 5.0
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups. 
Table A5.  Decision Making Evacuation Statistics (G-CAFH, 2008)
Among All, Would Obey Future Evacuation Orders (%)
Why Evacuate (%)
TotalLouisiana Mississippi
Why Not Evacuate (%)
Why Not Evacuate for Households with Children (%)
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported permanent and stable home, 
excluding any trailers, and does not plan on moving in the next year.
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Table A6.  Evacuation Logistics (G-CAFH, 2008)
Total
Unstable a Stable Unstable Stable
127 140 140 122 529
Before hurricane hit 76.4 81.4 72.9 73.8 76.2
After hurricane hit 2.4 0.7 2.1 0.8 1.5
Did not evacuate from mandatory  evacuation location 4.7 5.0 20.0 22.1 12.9
Did not evacuate from all other locations 15.7 12.9 1.4 3.3 8.3
Was away / Vacation 0.8 0 3.6 0 1.1
Mean # in evacuated party b 6.1 4.9 4.9 4.4 5.1
Mean # of children 1.2 1.0 1.2† 0.7 1.1
Mean # of adults 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1
Mean # not part of household 2.8 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
Private transportation 92.9 93.9 99.0 100.0 96.3
Public transportation 7.1 6.1 1.0 0.0 3.7
Louisiana 36.0 32.2 5.7 1.1 19.5
Mississippi 11.0 21.7 66.7 68.1 40.9
Alabama 15.0 9.6 11.4 19.8 13.6
Georgia 15.0 11.3 2.9 2.2 8.0
Texas 11.0 9.6 1.0 0 5.6
Other locations 12.0 15.7 12.4 8.8 12.4
Mean cost of transportation** ($) 205.38 169.26 144.64 124.44 159.84
Mean cost of food ($) 210.06 211.58 180.26 154.71 191.75
Mean cost of shelter*** ($) 157.72 210.16 93.37 91.11 141.35
Mean total cost*** ($) 573.16 591.00 418.26 370.56 493.65
Mean # days evacuated*** 6.1 5.4 4.3 3.5 4.9
Mean total cost per person per day ($) 15.48 22.56 19.95 24.02 20.49
Difficulty paying for evacuation** (%) 89.4 82.9 81.7† 69.2 81.0
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.
†p<0.05,††p<0.01,†††p<0.001 significant difference within state.
Size of Party Evacuated (#)
Louisiana Mississippi
When did you Evacuate? (%)
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported permanent and stable home, 
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Table A7.  Household Impact (G-CAFH, 2008)
Total
Unstable a Stable Unstable Stable
Total (n) 127 140 140 122 529
Had problems with water 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
Had problems with food*** 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.9
Had problems with shelter 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
Had problems with safety** 0.7† 0.3 0.5†† 0.1 0.4
Lost a job 7.1 6.4 4.3 2.5 5.1
Lost income* 60.3 60.7 47.9 46.7 54.0
Damage 12.5 9.4 10.1 7.7 10.4
Mean Score*** 7.9††† 5.4 8.2† 6.4 7.0
Have PTSD b  (%)** 23.6*** 7.9 22.1 14.8 17.0
Better than before Gustav 6.3 7.1 2.9 4.9 5.3
Worse than before Gustav 28.4 20.0 27.1 18.0 23.4
Same as before Gustav 64.6 72.1 68.6 76.2 70.3
Other 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.8 1.0
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.
†p<0.05,††p<0.01,†††p<0.001 significant difference within state.
Louisiana Mississippi
Average # Days After Gustav Hit:
Economic Impact in Household  (%)
Trauma Score Questionnaire (TSQ)
Recovery from Hurrican Katrina (%)
Housing Damage
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported permanent and stable 
home, excluding any trailers, and does not plan on moving in the next year. bPTSD is defined as scoring >6 on the 12-item TSQ scale.
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Table A8.  Child Impact (G-CAFH, 2008)
Louisiana Mississippi Total
257 236 493
New Emotional or Behavioral Problems 25.0 27.1 26.0
Very sad or depressed 26.9 17.4 22.3
Nervous or afraid 33.1 28.4 30.8
Problems sleeping 22.6 19.9 21.3
Problems getting along with other children 15.6 11.0 13.4
Needed Medication during Gustav 28.4 20.8 24.8
Had problems getting medication if needed 15.1 10.2 13.1
Specific problems getting medication c :
Didn’t know where to go to get prescription 54.6 0 37.5
No insurance** 0 100.0 31.3
Didn’t know where to go to fill prescription 45.5 0 31.3
No access to medical records 9.1 0 6.3
No money* 9.1 100.0 37.5
Other 18.2 0 12.5
Need on-going care 30.0 25.9 28.0
Had problems getting on-going medical care 11.7 0 6.5
Illness or Injury that required medical care 10.9 14.8 12.8
Did NOT receive care for Illness or injury 14.3 0 6.4
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significant difference across all groups.
Urgent Care (%)
Notes:  aPre-existing condtions  are defined as any health condition which existed before Hurricane Gustav. bWeighting is used to adjust 
responses to the number of children in the household according to number of children in household  one week before Hurricane Gustav. 
cBased on eight respondents before weighting.
Total (weighted nb)
Medical Issues During Gustav (%)
























Odds Ratio P value 95% Confidence Intervals
Socio-demographics
Black 0.92 0.839 0.43, 1.97
Household income <$10,000 1.26 0.550 0.59, 2.71
Louisiana 1.52 0.270 0.72, 3.21
Household Characteristics
Unstable housing a 1.69 0.140 0.84, 3.39
Poor parental mental health b 3.25 0.000 1.70, 6.23
No stable wage-earner 1.16 0.682 0.56, 2.37
Lack of parental social support network 2.36 0.020 1.15, 4.85
Number of people in household 0.86 0.195 0.69, 1.08
Problems with rent/utilities/food 1.42 0.298 0.73, 2.78
Community Characteristics
Unsafe neighborhood 1.83 0.114 0.86, 3.90
Low sense of social engagement 0.95 0.292 0.85, 1.05
Event/Response Characteristics
Number of times moved since Katrina 1.08 0.242 0.95, 1.24
Evacuated for Gustav 1.00 0.996 0.45, 2.22
Table A9.  Factors Associated with Children's Reported Emotional Health Symptoms Post-Gustav 
(G-CAFH, 2008)
Notes: aHousing Stability  definition: since Hurricane Katrina, respondent is living or has lived in a self-reported permanent and 





Table A10.  Household Composition and Evacuation Decisions (G-CAFH, 2008)
Total
Children Ages 0-5 Children Ages 6-18 All Others
66 117 267 450
Yes 87.9 88.0 82.8 84.9
No  12.1 12.0 17.2 15.1
Total (n)
Evacuated (%)
Households with…
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
